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NOTE 
AN UNREASONABLE 
ONLINE SEARCH: 
HOW A SHERIFF'S WEBCAMS 
STRENGTHENED FOURTH 
AMENDMENT PRIVACY RIGHTS 
OF PRETRIAL DETAINEES 
INTRODUCTION 
Self-described as the "toughest sheriff in America," Sheriff 
Joe Arpaio of Arizona's Maricopa County is known for imple-
menting controversial programs for jail inmates. 1 His pro-
grams include making inmates wear pink underwear, eat green 
bologna, and confining them in a "tent city" outside while using 
the jailhouse as an animal shelter! Sheriff Arpaio has created 
the nation's first all-female chain gang and has recently started 
the nation's first all-juvenile chain gang.3 He has also created 
1 See Elvia Diaz, Arpaio Easily Beats GOP Challenger Saban, THE ARIzONA 
REPUBLIC, Sep. 8, 2004, at B5, available at 2004 WL 90090953; see also Maricopa 
County Sheriffs Office Homepage, at 
http://www.mcso.org!submenu.asp?flle=aboutsheriff&page=l (last visited Feb. 10, 
2005). 
2 See Maxim Kniazkov, Toughest US Sheriff Fights Crime with Pink Underwear, 
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Feb. 4, 2004, available at 2004 WL 69946501; see also Mi· 
chael Tierney, Women in Chains, THE HERALD, Dec. 6, 2003 at 6 (noting bologna turns 
green when not properly mixed; air gets into the meat, resulting in oxidation), avail-
able at 2003 WL 69410223. 
3 Quynh Tran, Arpaio Ready to Start Chain Gangs for Teens, THE ARIZONA 
REPUBLIC, Mar. 6, 2004, at B1, available at 2004 WL 71704990; see also Maricopa 
County Sheriffs Office Homepage, supra note 1. Both male and female chain gangs 
1 
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the cheapest inmate meals in the country, averaging less than 
20 cents per meal.' In July of 2000, Sheriff Arpaio installed 
webcams in one of his jails and streamed live images of detain-
ees over the world-wide web.6 When the Sheriff announced the 
installation, he proclaimed, "[w]e get people booked in for mur-
der all the way down to prostitution .... When those johns are 
arrested, they can wave to their wives on the camera."" 
The jail exclusively houses people who have been arrested, 
but have not yet been found guilty of their charged offenses! 
Twenty-four former detainees sued the Sheriff to have the web-
cams removed, alleging the webcam policy violated their consti-
tutional rights against pretrial punishment.s In Demery v. Ar-
paio, the Ninth Circuit considered the detainees' claims, and 
held that broad exposure of their daily activities in confinement 
amounted to punishment." Sheriff Joe Arpaio has justified his 
policies on the basis that they save taxpayer money, educate 
the public, and improve the level of discipline necessary to run 
a safe correctional facility.'o Nevertheless, policies that benefit 
society at the expense of inmates not yet convicted of a crime 
raise Due Process issues. 
This Note will discuss how courts approach pretrial de-
tainees' claims of punishment, exploring both Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process claims and privacy rights under the 
Fourth Amendment. It will go on to discuss Demery's implica-
tions for Fourth Amendment privacy rights of pretrial detain-
ees. Part I explores the protections pretrial detainees are af-
forded under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause." 
Part l.A discusses the general differences between pretrial de-
tainees and convicted prisoners. 12 Part I.B considers two Su-
preme Court cases - Bell v. Wolfish and Block v. Rutherford -
that address the standards used in evaluating punishment 
provide the community with "thousands of dollars of free labor" by cleaning the streets, 
painting over graffiti, and burying the indigent in the county cemetery. Id. 
• Id. 
• Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1024 (9th Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed, 
73 U.S.L.W. 3462 (U.S. Jan. 19,2005) (No. 04-983). 
6 Id. at 1024. 
7Id. 
BId. at 1025. 
• Id. at 1033. 
10 See Maricopa County Sheriffs Office Homepage, supra note 1. 
11 See infra notes 18 to 100 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 18 to 35 and accompanying text. 
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claims in a pretrial detention context under the Due Process 
Clause.13 Part I.C explores the Fourth Amendment and privacy 
rights in general. 14 This section also discusses the level of pro-
tection prisoners and pretrial detainees are afforded under the 
Fourth Amendment after Hudson v. Palmer.16 This Note con-
siders the interactions between these lines of cases in order to 
clarify the actual scope of privacy rights retained by pretrial 
detainees. Part II of the Note will examine the factual history 
and majority and minority opinions in Demery.16 Finally, Part 
III will discuss the impact Demery may have on pretrial de-
tainees' privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment. I ' 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. PRETRIAL DETAINEES DISTINGUISHED FROM CONVICTED 
PRISONERS 
Pretrial Detainees are people who have been arrested for 
an alleged criminal offense and are in jail awaiting trial. ls They 
are detained prior to trial because they do not qualify for re-
lease on personal recognizance or bail. 19 Accordingly, pretrial 
detainees are confined for the sole purpose of assuring of their 
presence at trial. 20 Convicted inmates, on the other hand, are 
those who have been found guilty of a criminal·. offense:1 
Unlike pretrial confinement, the purposes served by confining 
convicted prisoners are retribution, rehabilitation, deterrence, 
and prevention.22 
13 See infra notes 101 to 127 and accompanying text. 
,. See infra notes 128 to 219 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 107 to 127 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 220 to 239 and accompanying text. 
17 See infra notes 218 to 236 and accompanying text. 
18 Bell v. WolfISh, 441 U.S. 520, 523 (1979) . 
.. Norris v. Frame, 585 F.2d 1183, 1184 (3rd Cir. 1978). See BLACK's LAw 
DICTIONARY 1299 (8th ed. 2004) (defming "personal recognizance" as "[tlhe release of a 
defendant in a criminal case in which the court takes the defendant's word that he or 
she will appear for a scheduled matter or when told to appear.") 
20 Boring v. Kozakiewicz, 833 F.2d 468, 477-478 (1987) (Gibbons, C. J., dissent-
ing). 
21 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 358 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "convict" as "to fmd a 
person guilty of a criminal offense upon a criminal trial, a plea of guilty, or a plea of 
nolo contendere (no contest)." Id. 
22 See generally James L. Esposito, Comment, Virtual Freedom--Physical Con-
finement: An Analysis of Prisoner Use of the Internet, 26 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CN. 
CONFINEMENT 39, 59-65 (2000). 
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Although not yet convicted of any crime, pretrial detainees 
are subject to curtailed constitutional privacy rights while de-
tained.23 The Supreme Court has held that restrictions on con-
stitutional rights are necessary to maintain security within 
jails and prisons.24 For example, the government may impose 
restrictions to ensure that inmates do not obtain weapons or 
illicit drugs. 25 The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that 
pretrial detainees pose a lesser security risk than convicted 
inmates. 26 
Neither convicted inmates nor pretrial detainees lose all of 
their civil rights when they are lawfully confined.27 Among the 
rights they retain is a diminished expectation of privacy under 
the Fourth Amendment, and rights under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United 
States Constitution.28 While it is unclear whether pretrial de-
tainees retain more rights than convicted prisoners, the Su-
preme Court has stated that pretrial detainees retain "at least" 
those constitutional rights enjoyed by convicted prisoners.29 
While this suggests pretrial detainees retain more constitu-
tional rights than convicted prisoners, the Supreme Court has 
23 Bell, 441 U.S. at 545, 546 fn. 28. 
'" Id. at 540. 
'" Id. 
26 Id. at 546 fn. 28. The Court suggested that pretrial detainees may occasionally 
pose an even greater security risk than convicted inmates: 
"In the federal system, a detainee is committed to the detention facility only be· 
cause no other less drastic means can reasonably assure his presence at trial .... As 
a result, those who are detained prior to trial may in many cases be individuals 
who are charged with serious crimes or who have prior records. They also may 
pose a greater risk of escape than convicted inmates." Id. 
See also, Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440, 1446 (5th Cir. 1993) ("mt is impractical to 
draw a line between convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees for the purpose of main· 
taining jail security. "). 
27 Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 5 n.2 (1978). 
26 Bell, 441 U.S. at 557; U.S. Const. amend. 14; see also, Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 
U.S. 539 (1974) (holding prisoners enjoy the protections of Due Process). 
29 Bell, 441 U.S. 520, 545. For an argument favoring higher standards of treat· 
ment for pretrial detainees, see Gary Wood, Note, Recent Applications of the Ban on 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments: Judicially Enforced Reform of Nonfederal Penal 
Institutions, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 1111, 1128 (citing Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182 
(E.D. Ark. 1971) ("It is clear that the conditions for pretrial detention must not only be 
equal to, but superior to, those permitted for prisoners serving sentences for the crimes 
they have committed against society.") Id. at 1191. 
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declined to elaborate further."o One clear distinction between 
pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners is that only pretrial 
detainees receive protection against punishment under the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.'1 
Government action constitutes punishment when (1) that 
action causes the inmate to suffer some harm or "disability," 
and (2) the purpose of the action is to punish the inmate.'2 Pun-
ishment also requires that the harm or disability be signifi-
cantly greater than, or be independent of, the inherent discom-
forts of confinement.33 The Due Process Clause prohibits the 
punishment of pretrial detainees." Convicted prisoners, how-
ever, may be punished so long as the punishment is not cruel 
and unusual.'5 
B. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS AND 
PuNISHMENT 
Under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, 
states may not punish detained persons until they are found 
guilty of a crime.'6 The Fourteenth Amendment does not, how-
30 See Gabriel M. Helmer, Strip Search and the Felony Detainee: A Case for Rea-
sonable Suspicion, 81 B.U. L. REV. 239, 258 (2001). 
31 Bell, 441 U.S. at 535. Conversely, convicted prisoners may be punished so long 
as the punishment does not rise to the Eighth Amendment's "cruel and unusual" stan-
dard. [d. at n.16. See also, Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (stating that punish-
ing convicted inmates "effectuates prison management and prisoner rehabilitative 
goals.") [d. at 485. 
32 Bell, 441 U.S. at 538; but see, Hart v. Sheahan, 2005 WL 221963 (7th Cir. 
2005) (Posner. J.) (noting that it is "unclear" as to "why proof of a punitive purpose 
should be necessary .... Punishment is not the only possible motive for brutal treat-
ment. But whatever the motive is, if the brutal treatment is gratuitous, due process in 
its substantive sense has been violated.") [d. at *3. 
33 See id. at 537. See also Fischer v. Winter, 564 F. Supp. 281, 291 (N.D. Cal. 
1983) (noting that inherent conditions of confinement include being in close quarters 
with mentally disturbed inmates, and a lack of physical security, as violence is a "fact 
of life in a jail"); O'Bryan v. Saginaw County, Mich., 529 F. Supp. 206,215 (E.D. Mich. 
1981), affd, 741 F.2d 283 (6th Cir. 1984) (noting that inability to touch, embrace or kiss 
and converse without a barrier during visitation is an inherent incident of incarcera-
tion). 
,. Bell, 441 U.S. at 535. See also, Hart, 2005 WL 221963, at *3 ('"Punishment' ... 
is really just a name for unreasonably harsh treatment meted out to inmates who have 
not yet been convicted of any crime.") 
36 Bell, 441 U.S. at 537 n.16. 
36 [d. at 535; U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth Amendment provides: "No 
State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without Due Process of 
law .... " See also Hart, 2005 WL 221963, at *2 ("The 'liberty' that the due process 
clauses secure against deprivation without due process of law includes not only the 
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ever, prohibit punishment of detainees altogether; jail officials 
may punish detainees for bad behavior or other disruptive acts 
committed while detained, but not for the crimes that led to 
their detention:7 Pretrial detainees seeking to raise punish-
ment claims must do so under the Fourteenth Amendment.3S 
The major Supreme Court case to address punishment 
claims raised by pretrial detainees was Bell u. Wolfish. 39 In Bell, 
jail administrators implemented several regulations designed 
to maintain order and institutional security within the jail:o 
The detainees claimed these regulations were excessive and 
amounted to impermissible punishment:' The Court formu-
lated a test to determine whether a policy constitutes a regula-
tion or punishment." The regulations must be reasonably re-
lated to maintaining security, and must not be excessive in 
achieving that purpose:3 The Court also noted that adminis-
trators of correctional institutions should be given "wide-
ranging deference" in the adoption and execution of policies:' 
The Supreme Court readdressed pretrial detainees' punish-
ment claims in Block u. Rutherford!· Block reiterated that 
courts were to playa "very limited role" in assessing the consti-
tutionality of a challenged regulation, and should defer to cor-
rections officials' "expertise."·6 In each case, the challenged jail 
policies were held to be reasonable." 
right to be free, which pretrial detainees do not have, but also the right to bodily integ-
rity, which they do.") 
37 See, e.g., Collazo-Leon v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 51 F.3d 315 (1st Cir. 
1995) (holding that jail's punishment of detainee who attempted to escape and bribed a 
guard to induce his assistance in escape was proper); Blakeney v. Rusk County Sherif{, 
89 Fed. Appx. 897 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding jail's punishment of detainee by coniming 
him to a chair for twenty hours was appropriate where detainee flooded and set fire to 
his cell), available at 2004 WL 442672. 
38 Bell, 441 U.S. at 537 n.16; see also, Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) 
(holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment against 
those already convicted of a crime). 
39 Bell, 441 U.S. 520. 
40 [d. at 528-29. 
" [d. at 526. 
42 [d. at 538-39; see infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text. 
43 [d. at 538 . 
.. [d. at 547 . 
.. Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984). 
46 [d. at 584 . 
• 7 [d. at 591; Bell, 441 U.S. at 562. 
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1. Bell v. Wolfish - Punishment Distinguished from Regula-
tion 
7 
Bell v. Wolfish was the first Supreme Court case to outline 
the constitutional restrictions and conditions of pretrial con-
finement .. a Pretrial detainees at the New York City Metropoli-
tan Correctional Center brought a class action lawsuit against 
the Center's administrator, claiming that several of the jail's 
conditions amounted to impermissible punishment .. • Among 
other conditions, the inmates complained of "double-bunking," 
a "publisher-only" rule, and a prohibition against inmates re-
ceiving packages of food and personal items from outside the 
jail.60 Inmates also challenged a rule requiring them to remain 
outside of their rooms during routine "shakedown" inspec-
tions.51 Finally, they challenged the jail's practice of conduct-
ing visual body-cavity searches of inmates following contact 
visits.52 
The Court determined that each practice was rationally re-
lated to a legitimate regulatory purpose.53 Addressing the dou-
ble-bunking rule, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, 
noted that the "one man, one cell" principle did not exist in the 
constitution.5< While the Court admitted the sleeping space was 
"rather small," the detainees spent minimal time in their cells 
and were not detained in the jail long enough for the conditions 
to be called punishment. 55 The publisher-only rule was a ra-
tional response to the security problem of preventing the 
.. Dennis D. Cohen, Comment, Substantive Due Process Rights of Pretrial De-
tainees after Bell v. Wolfish, 65 IOWA L. REV. 818, 819 (1979-1980) . 
• 9 Bell, 441 U.S. at 523. 
50 Id. at 528, 529. 
5' Id. at 554-555. A "shake-down" is when all inmates are cleared from their 
residential units while a team of guards searches each room. Id. 
"Id. at 555, 558 n.39. These searches were required on less than probable 
cause. After contact visits, males were required to lift their genitals and bend over to 
spread their buttocks for visual inspection. The vaginal and anal cavities of female 
inmates were also inspected. Id. 
53 Id. at 560-561. 
54 See id. The "Double-bunking" practice consisted of replacing single-bunks with 
double-bunks in individual rooms. Thus, rooms originally intended for single occupancy 
were used as sleeping quarters for two inmates. 
50 See id. at 543-544. The detainees spent only 7 or 8 hours, usually sleeping at 
night, in their cells. The length of detention lasted generally a maximum period of 60 
days. 
7
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smuggling of contraband in books sent from outside.56 Books 
sent directly from the publisher were much less likely to con-
tain money, drugs, or weapons hidden in the bindings. 57 The 
ban on receiving outside packages was rational for similar rea-
sons.58 Additionally, allowing outside packages would require 
substantial resources to inspect all contents of every package 
for contraband.59 The policy of conducting unannounced shake-
downs in the detainees' absence was rational because it facili-
tated a safe and effective way to search the cells.60 Finally, the 
visual body cavity searches were held to be rational because 
the searches effectively mitigated the danger of detainees 
smuggling contraband into thejail.61 Thus, all of the challenged 
conditions were held to be permissible regulations, imple-
mented to further the legitimate governmental objectives of 
security and order.62 
The Court discarded the notion that a detainee's subjective 
feelings (i.e., that she feels punished) are relevant in analyzing 
the constitutionality of a regulation.63 Detention inevitably in-
terferes with a detainee's desire to live comfortably."' The fact 
that the restrictions inherent in detention intrude on that de-
sire does not convert those restrictions into punishment:s Nev-
ertheless, in some instances, courts may infer from the pres-
ence of arbitrary or purposeless restrictions that intent to pun-
ish exists. 66 The Court formulated a test to determine whether 
jail administrators' actions constitute a punishment or a regu-
lation. 
In determining whether a certain condition constitutes a 
regulation or a punishment, courts look to whether there was 
56 Id. at 550-552. The ·publisher-only" rule prohibited inmates from receiving 
hard-cover books not mailed directly from publishers. 
57 Id. at 551. 
56 Id. at 555. 
59 Id. at 553. 
60 Id. at 556-557. The Court rejected the claim that the searches in the detain-
ees' absence violated their Fourth Amendment rights. The Court noted that, even 
assuming the detainees had an expectation of privacy in their cells, permitting them to 
watch the searches in no way lessened the invasion of privacy. Id. 
61 Id. at 558-562 
62 Id. at 560-561. 
63 Id. at 537 
54 Id. 
50 Id . 
.. Id. at 539. 
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an express intent to punish.67 Absent an express intent to pun-
ish, courts ask whether the restriction may be rationally con-
nected to serving the alternative, nonpunitive purpose assigned 
to it.6s If the restriction is rationally related to the alternative 
purpose, but appears excessive in relation to that purpose, 
courts will infer intent to punish.69 Thus, jail officials are not 
required to use the least imposing security measure; they must 
only refrain from implementing a restriction that appears ex-
cessive to the purpose it serves.70 In addition, the Bell majority 
expressly discouraged courts from skeptically questioning chal-
lenged restrictions. 71 In applying the above test, courts were 
commanded to afford administrators "wide-ranging deference" 
in implementing policies to maintain institutional security.72 
Thus, Bell is known as the beginning of the "Deference Pe-
riod."73 
2. Block v. Rutherford 
In Block v. Rutherford, the Supreme Court made it clear 
that the Bell test was to be applied in strong deference to jail 
administrators." The Court encouraged lower courts to refrain 
from second-guessing correctional officials about allegedly ex-
67 Id. at 538 n.4. 
68 Id. 
69 Id., (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (963)). The 
Bell test is restricted to claims by pretrial detainees. In addressing claims of constitu-
tional violations by convicted prisoners, courts make a four-part inquiry into the "rea-
sonableness" of a challenged prison regulation under Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 
(987): 0) There must be a "valid, rational connection" between the prison regulation 
and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it; (2) whether there 
are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates; (3) 
the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and 
other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally, and (4) the absence 
of ready alternatives is evidence that a prison regulation is reasonable. Id. at 89-90. 
70 Bell, 441 U.S. at 559 n.40. (noting that the existence of less restrictive alter-
natives to body-cavity searches (i.e., use of metal detection, more closely monitoring 
contact visits, or banning contact visits altogether) does not render the body-cavity 
search policy unreasonable). 
71 Id. at 547. 
72Id. 
73 See Jack E. Call, The Supreme Court and Prisoners' Rights, 59 FED. 
PROBATION 36 (1995). ("Historically, the Supreme Court case law on prisoners' rights 
can be divided into three periods: 1) the Hands-Off Period (before 1964), 2) the Rights 
Period (1964-78), and 3) the Deference Period 0979-present).") 
7. Block, 468 U.S. at 584. 
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cessive practices. 75 The Court once again reversed a Ninth Cir-
cuit case which held that detainees were punished unconstitu-
tionally.7. In Block, pretrial detainees brought a class action 
lawsuit against county jail officials alleging that many of the 
jail's policies violated Due Process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.77 Two of the policies made it to the Supreme 
Court: the prohibition of contact visits with the detainees' 
spouses, children, and friends, and the policy of conducting ir-
regularly scheduled shakedown searches of cells when occu-
pants were absent.7s The district court for the Central District 
of California sustained these challenges, and ordered the jail to 
allow low-risk detainees contact visits and permit them to 
watch searches of their cells. 79 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit 
remanded. so The court noted that the existence of less restric-
tive security measures was not proof of an exaggerated re-
sponse to security concerns. SI 
On remand, the district court reaffirmed its previous or-
ders, reasoning that although the jail authorities did not con-
sciously intend to punish, the practices in question were never-
theless excessive.S2 On second appeal, the Ninth Circuit was 
satisfied that the district court properly accorded the jail condi-
tions "thorough review" as mandated by Bell. sa The court af-
firmed the contact-visit and cell-search orders. S4 The Court of 
Appeals pointed out that the district court judge based his de-
cision concerning the contact visits on a comparison of the jail's 
75 Rights of Prisoners and Pretrial Detainees, 98 HARv. L. REV. 151, 152 (1984). 
76 Block, 468 U.S. at 582. 
77 [d. at 578. Specifically, the inmates challenged the jail's policy of denying 
contact visits with the detainees' spouses, children, and friends. The inmates also chal-
lenged the jail's practice of irregularly scheduled shakedown searches of cells when 
occupants were absent. The inmates also complained of being confined to rooms lack-
ing windows. 
78 [d. at 578. The prohibition on contact visits applied to all detainees, regardless 
of the crime charged. See id. at 596-597 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[A) pretrial de-
tainee is not permitted any physical contact with members of his family, regardless of 
how long he is incarcerated pending his trial or how slight is the risk that he will abuse 
a visitation privilege.") 
78 See, Rutherford v. Pitchess, 457 F. Supp. 104 (C.D. Cal. 1978), affd, 710 F.2d 
572 (9th Cir. 1983), reu'd, 468 U.S. 576 (1984). 
80 Block, 468 U.S. at 581. 
81 [d. 
82 [d. 
83 See, Rights of Prisoners and Pretrial Detainees, 98 HARv. L. REV. at 153. 
84 [d. 
10
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visitation practices with those of other county institutions.85 
The judge considered the specific capacities, limitations, and 
security risks of the particular jail at issue. s6 He also person-
ally visited the jail and observed four alternative methods to 
conducting cell searches. 87 Based on these first-hand observa-
tions, he concluded that the cell searches conducted in the in-
mates' absence violated their Due Process rights.88 The judge 
felt that the methods employed were excessive in relation to 
their purpose. 89 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, absent proof of 
intent to punish, a detainee must prove the challenged condi-
tions are so exaggerated and excessive as to warrant an infer-
ence of intent.90 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger 
echoed Bell's demand that lower courts ordinarily defer to the 
so Rutherford, 710 F.2d at 576. 
86 [d. at 577. 
87 [d. 
88 [d. 
89 [d. 
00 See Block, 468 U.S. at 584, (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 538 (quoting Kennedy, 372 
U.S. at 168-169)). See e.g., Atwood v. Vilsack, 338 F. Supp. 2d 985 (S.D. Iowa 2004) 
(holding conditions of pretrial detainees' confmement, including keeping them in lock-
down the majority of the day, and denying them reasonable access to visitors, tele-
phones, educational programming, mental health treatment, recreation, exercise, reli-
gious services, medical care, and hygiene, were not reasonably related to government's 
objective of preventing them from harming themselves or others, and thus violated 
their Due Process rights); State ex rel. Riley v. Rudloff, 575 S.E.2d 377 (2002) (holding 
that state statute prohibiting applications for involuntary hospitalization of pretrial 
detainees violated their Due Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment); 
Newkirk v. Sheers, 834 F. Supp. 772 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (inferring intent to punish where 
detainees were paired in single occupancy cells and not provided a second bed); Robles 
v. Prince George's County, Maryland, 302 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that offi-
cers' tying up pretrial detainee to metal pole in deserted parking lot for ten minutes 
was arbitrary and purposeless); Terry ex rel. Terry v. Hill, 232 F. Supp. 2d 934 (E.D. 
Ark. 2002) (inferring intent to punish from inordinate delays of several months in 
providing evaluation and treatment of pretrial detainees for purposes of determining 
their fitness to stand trial); Stevenson v. Anderson, No. CIV.A.3:00-CV-2157-M, 2002 
WL 432889 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 18,2002) (holding sufficient basis for Due Process violation 
where jail officials failed to provide detainees safe, sanitary showers and ignored re-
quests for medical treatment required for injuries suffered therein); Campbell v. Cau-
thron, 623 F.2d 503, 507 (8th Cir. 1980) (Due Process violated where up to eight pre-
trial detainees were held in approximately 130 square feet for 24 hours per day, with 
release three times weekly for periods of 15 to 30 minutes); Lock v. Jenkins, 641 F.2d 
488 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that arbitrary confinement of all pretrial detainees in 
prison cells measuring eight feet by four feet eight inches for 22 hours per day without 
regard for the individual situations of each detainee, when the average length of con-
finement was about 60 days, amounted to punishment). 
11
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"expert judgment" of corrections officials when considering the 
"excessiveness" of security measures.91 
The Block majority found the blanket restriction on contact 
visits rational for a variety of reasons. It recalled dicta in Bell 
in which the Court discussed a prohibition on contact visits as 
one permissible alternative to the body cavity searches.92 Chief 
Justice Burger stressed that contact visits leave the jail vul-
nerable to visitors smuggling in weapons, drugs, and other con-
traband."3 Chief Justice Burger also emphasized the potential 
for some detainees to hold visitors or jail staff hostage to effect 
escape attempts.9' Low-risk detainees could also potentially be 
enlisted to help obtain contraband.95 Thus, the policy prohibit-
ing contact visits bore a rational connection to the legitimate 
goal of internal security.96 In addressing the cell-search chal-
lenge, the Court declined to reconsider the issue; it had already 
declared a virtually identical policy valid in Bell. 97 
Like Bell, the Block Court found that the challenged prac-
tices constituted restrictions that were reasonably related to 
maintaining security. The majority further noted that the dis-
trict court improperly substituted its judgment for that of the 
administrators in determining whether the policy was exces-
sively intrusive. 98 So long as a policy "reasonably relates to le-
gitimate governmental objectives," an inference of punishment 
will not be drawn.99 
In both Bell and Block, pretrial detainees raised Fourth 
Amendment challenges to policies which allowed officers to 
search their cells. In both cases, the Court found that the 
searches were not unreasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment. lOO The following section explores the extent of Fourth 
Amendment protection afforded to pretrial detainees. 
91 Block, 468 u.s. at 584. 
92 [d. at 586 n.7. 
93 [d. 
"[d . 
.. [d. at 587. 
96 [d. at 586. 
97 [d. at 591. 
98 Rights of Prisoners and Pretrial Detainees, 98 HARv. L. REV. at 152 . 
.. Block, 468 U.S. at 584. 
100 See, supra notes 51-61 and accompanying text. 
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C. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable 
government searches and seizures. lol A search is "unreasonable" 
when the person being searched has a subjective expectation of 
privacy in the area searched that society accepts as objectively 
reasonable.102 At the heart of the Fourth Amendment are the 
privacy interests of individuals. 103 In each case, courts must 
balance the need for the particular search against the invasion 
of personal rights that the search entails. 10. Courts must con-
sider the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which 
it occurs, the justification for its initiation, and the location 
where it happens. l05 Without a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy, the intrusion does not amount to a "search" for Fourth 
Amendment purposes. 106 
In Hudson v. Palmer, the Supreme Court squarely ad-
dressed the Fourth Amendment's applicability to an inmate's 
cell. 107 In Hudson, a correctional officer conducted a "shake-
down" search of inmate Russel Palmer's cell. loa During the 
search, the officer discovered a ripped pillow case in the trash 
can beside Palmer's bunk. 109 Palmer was later found guilty on a 
101 U.S. Const. amend. IV. The full text of the Fourth Amendment states: "The 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." 
102 See, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
("[T]here is a twofold requirement, fIrst that a person have exhibited an actual (subjec-
tive) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is 
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable."') [d. In describing the "reasonable" test, the 
Supreme Court has said it has "no talisman that determines in all cases those privacy 
expectations that society is prepared to accept as reasonable. Instead, 'the Court has 
given weight to such factors as the intention of the Framers of the Fourth Amendment, 
the uses to which the individual has put a location, and our societal understanding that 
certain areas deserve the most scrupulous protection from government invasion.'" 
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987) (O'Connor, J.) (quoting Oliver v. United 
States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984». 
103 Se, United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165, 197 (9th Cir. 1978). 
104 Bell, 441 U.S. at 559. 
106 [d. 
106 See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 874 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting). 
107 468 U.S. 517 (1984); see also Soria v. State, 933 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1996) (holding Hudson reasoning "applies in the context of pretrial detention in jail"). 
[d. at 60 
108 Hudson, 468 U.S. at 519. 
109 [d. 
13
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charge of destroying state property."O Palmer then sued the 
officer, claiming the search of his cell was an unreasonable 
search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. "' The district 
court granted summary judgment to the officer, but the Court 
of Appeals reversed."2 The Fourth Circuit held that an inmate 
has a "limited privacy right" in a cell, entitling him to protec-
tion against searches conducted solely to harass or to humili-
ate."3 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a prisoner 
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his prison cell war-
ranting protection under the Fourth Amendment."' 
The majority reasoned that society accepts loss of freedom 
and privacy as inherent incidents of confinement."· Accord-
ingly, confined persons do not have any subjective expectation 
of privacy that society deems objectively reasonable."s In other 
words, since inmates have no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in their cells, a cell-search is not a "search" under the Fourth 
Amendment. ll7 
After Hudson, some courts and commentators have consid-
ered whether inmates maintain any right to privacy under the 
Fourth Amendment."s The Ninth Circuit has demonstrated 
that it is possible to extend Fourth Amendment protections to 
incarcerated inmates, and still be consistent with Hudson."o In 
Thompson v. Souza, a prisoner alleged that three prison offi-
cials subjected him to an unreasonable strip search in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment.'20 After discussing the context of the 
search, The Ninth Circuit concluded the searches were reason-
able.121 Consistent with Hudson, the court found the searches 
to be reasonably related to the officials' interest in keeping 
drugs out of the prison.122 In dicta, the court suggested that ex-
110 Id. at 520. 
III Id. at 522. 
112 Id. at 521. 
113 Id. 
11< Id. at 526. 
115 Id. at 528 (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 537). 
116 Id. at 526. 
117 See id. 
118 Deborah L. MacGregor, Note, Stripped of All Reason? The Appropriate Stan-
dard for Evaluating Strip Searches of Arrestees and Pretrial Detainees in Correctional 
Facilities, 36 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 163, 174 n.62 (2003). 
119 See, Thompson v. Souza, 111 F.3d 694, 699 (9th Cir. 1997). 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 701. 
122 Id. 
14
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tending Fourth Amendment protections to confined persons 
was consistent with Hudson: "Notwithstanding the language 
in Hudson [stating that a Fourth Amendment right to privacy 
is "fundamentally incompatible" with necessary security meas-
ures], our circuit has held that the Fourth Amendment right to 
be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures extends 
to incarcerated prisoners. IIl' 3 
Despite Hudson's broad language, the Supreme Court's 
Fourth Amendment analysis was limited within the framework 
of institutional security. I" The majority balanced two interests: 
society's interest in secure penal institutions, and the pris-
oner's interest "in privacy within his cell.1Il2s The Court held 
that an inmate's expectation of privacy must "always yield" to 
the paramount interest of institutional security.12. Thus, Hud-
son did not discard the notion that inmates retain an expecta-
tion of privacy in their cells when the search is unrelated to 
institutional security.127 
II. DEMERYV. ARpAlO 
In Demery v. Arpaio, the Ninth Circuit considered whether 
a jail's use of web cams to stream live images of pretrial detain-
ees over the internet constituted punishment in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 12B The court noted that the Due Proc-
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from 
punishing detained persons prior to their being found guilty.12. 
After evaluating Sheriff Arpaio's justifications for the webcam 
policy and its impact on the inmates, the court determined that 
the policy violated the detainees' rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause.13o Accordingly, the court's ma-
123 [d. at 699. 
124 Hudson, 468 U.S. at 527. 
125 [d. 
". [d. at 528. 
127 See e.g., United States v. Cohen, 796 F.2d 20 (2nd Cir. 1986) ("We read Hudson 
to hold that prison officials are presumed to do their best to evaluate and monitor ob-
jectively the security needs of the institution and the inmates in their custody, and 
then to determine whether and when such concerns necessitate a search of a prison cell 
... [T]he loss of [constitutional] rights is occasioned only by the legitimate needs of 
institutional security.") [d. at 23. 
128 Demery, 378 F.3d at 1020. 
129 [d. at 1028. 
130 [d. at 1033. 
15
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jority opinion held that the district court properly granted pre-
liminary injunctive relief.131 Judge Carlos Bea wrote a dissent-
ing opinion. 132 
A. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In July of 2000, Sheriff Arpaio installed four webcams in 
Phoenix's Madison Street Jail, which exclusively holds people 
awaiting trial. 133 The four webcams were placed in areas of the 
jail not open to the public except through prearranged tours.'3. 
One webcam faced the men's holding cell, capturing images of 
only a portion of the cell, including the bunk-bed area. 13S A sec-
ond web cam was trained on the pre-intake area, where pretrial 
detainees could be viewed being photographed, fingerprinted, 
and booked.136 A third web cam focused on the intake search 
area, capturing live images of pretrial detainees being sub-
jected to patdown searches.137 The fourth web cam was briefly 
directed at the toilet and surrounding area of the women's 
holding cell. 138 Initially, the Maricopa County's Sheriff's web-
site hosted the webcam images.13s A large number of visitors 
quickly overwhelmed the website's capacity, resulting in Sher-
131 [d. 
132 [d. at 1033 (Bea, J., dissenting). 
133 Howard Fischer, Court Blocks Sheriffs Use of Webcams, THE ARIZONA DAILY 
STAR, Aug. 7, 2004, at A3, available at 2004 WL 66802243. For a description of the 
Madison Street Jail, see the Maricopa County Sheriffs Homepage, at 
http://www.mcso.org!submenu.asp?flle=madison (last visited Feb. 10,2005). According 
to the website, the Madison Street Jail was designed to house 960 inmates, single-
bunked. The jail "is approximately 397,000 square feet, or one city block, and as tall as 
a ten story building." [d. Currently, Madison Street Jail houses more than 1,500 in-
mates, including: all maximum security inmates in Maricopa County; juveniles re-
manded to adult court; administratively segregated inmates (protective custody); close 
custody inmates (super maximum security); a state-licensed psychiatric unit; and 
working inmates assigned to Madison and downtown job sites. All inmates at the 
Madison Street Jail are pretrial detainees. [d. 
134 Demery, 378 F.3d at 1024. 
135 [d. 
136 [d. 
137 [d. 
138 [d. The plaintiffs claimed that this webcam streamed live images of the toilet 
area for six months, while the Sheriff contended that his officers moved the camera 
within hours of learning that the images of the toilet were being streamed over the 
internet. This webcam was ultimately repositioned to focus on the hallway area out-
side ofthe holding cells. 
139 [d. 
16
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iff Arpaio entering into an arrangement with another website, 
Crime.com, to stream the images to the public."o 
Website visitors were informed: 
If you find yourself sitting on this bunk, you probably have 
been arrested for drunk and disorderly behavior, drug posses-
sion, spousal abuse, o~ prostitution. Most people inside the 
Madison Street Jail are facing misdemeanor charges but 
Deputies see their fair share of murderers as well.141 
Visitors to Crime.com's "Jail Cam Special Ops" webpage saw 
the following four links: 
1. "crime. com's Virtual Tour: You are busted! Enter the Madi-
son Street Jail as a detainee and see what it's like to be 
booked, searched, and locked-up." 
2. "Meet Sheriff Joe: It's his jail and he's proud of it. Spend a 
day in the life of Sheriff Joe Arpaio on his own turf, where 
inmates wear pink underwear, eat green bologna and work on 
chain gangs." 
3. "Jail Cam: See the first live camera in a working jail. 
Watch what's happening at Madison Street Jail NOW." 
4. "Shakedown: See the first shakedown in four years at the 
Madison Street Jail. Watch as SWAT teams raid male and 
female inmate holding cells in search of smuggled drugs and 
crude weapons. "'42 
Visitors that selected the "Jail Cam" link were directed to a 
web page where they could select one of the four webcams.143 
Within the first few days of operation, the Crime.com web-
site recorded six million hits.'44 Web users from as far away as 
Sweden, Britain, and Germany visited the site. "5 Eventually, 
because the Crime.com website was unable to accommodate the 
140 [d. 
,., [d. 
142 [d. at 1024-1025. 
'43 [d. 
'44 [d at 1025. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 748 (8th ed. 2004) (derming "hit" as 
"[al single instance of a computer's connection to a webpage.") 
'45 Demery, 378 F.3d at 1025. 
17
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large number of visitors interested in watching the web cam 
images, the website ceased operations. 146 
In May of 2001, twenty-four former inmates at the Madi-
son Street Jail filed a lawsuit against Sheriff Arpaio and Mari-
copa County, in Arizona state court, seeking to enjoin the Sher-
iff from reactivating the webcams in the jail.147 The former in-
mates raised constitutional privacy claims and alleged they 
were punished in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.148 
The Sheriff and the County removed the case to the United 
States District Court for the District of Arizona.149 The district 
court rejected the detainees' argument that the Sheriff's con-
duct violated their constitutional privacy rights. 150 Neverthe-
less, the court held that the web cam policy constituted pun-
ishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution, and preliminarily enjoined the 
Sheriff from operating the webcams.151 
B. THE MAJORITY'S ANALYSIS 
1. The Bell Standard Controls 
The Ninth Circuit briefly addressed sua sponte whether 
the case was moot. 15' The court noted Sheriff Arpaio's efforts to 
146 See id. For reasons unclear from the record, the website ceased operations 
after the lawsuit was flied but before the district court granted the injunction. 
147 [d. The plaintiffs in this action are Jamie Demery, Samantha Moore, Aracelia 
Leticia Pfeifer, Janet Lee King, Jerri Cabaniss, Rosa Velazquez, Cynthia Matthers, 
Rhonda Farmer, Sandra Puebla, Jordan Martin, Laura Hartney, Elena M. Irvine, 
Yvette Rose Leon, Tina Marie Sox, Loretta Christie, Alison Lee Adair, Victoria Zepeda, 
Nikisha Calliste, Terry McEvoy, Tom Odenkirk, Dean Tousignant, Benny David 
Berryman, Damon Scoggin, and Sean Botkin. [d. at 1020. 
148 See Appellant's Reply Brief at 4, Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 
2004) (No. 03-15698), available at 2003 WL 22716980; Demery, 378 F.3d at 1028. 
149 Demery, 378 F.3d at 1025. 
u;o See Appellant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 
1020 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 04-983), available at 2005 WL 166979. 
16l Demery, 378 F.3d at 1025. 
152 The court noted that "two significant events" might render this case moot: the 
plaintiffs were released from the jail, and the webcam images were no longer online. 
Demery, 378 F.3d at 1025. Neither the plaintiffs nor the Sheriff and County contended 
on appeal that the case was moot. The court thus voluntarily considered the issue of 
mootness. [d. See Cook Inlet Treaty Tribes v. Shalala, 166 F.3d 986 (9th Cir.1999) 
("The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation 
... must continue throughout its existence." [d. at 989. See also, Powell v. McCormack, 
395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969) (stating that a case is "moot" when the issues presented are no 
longer live or the parties lack any legally cognizable interest in the outcome.) 
18
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find a new website host, and determined that the events were 
likely to recur.153 Concluding the case was not moot, the court 
addressed the Sheriff's arguments. 16' 
Sheriff Arpaio argued that the district court applied the 
wrong legal standard by using the Bell test. He argued that 
the Bell test for punishment was replaced by the "reasonable 
relation" test in Turner v. Safley. 166 In Turner, convicted in-
mates brought a class action challenging their prison's mail 
and marriage regulations.158 The Turner majority stated that 
courts should determine a policy's reasonableness by asking 
whether it is rationally connected to a legitimate governmental 
interest. 157 The Court held that the mail regulation was consti-
tutional because it was "reasonably related" to valid security 
interests.158 The Court struck down the marriage regulation as 
unconstitutional, finding that it was an exaggerated response 
to such interests. 159 The Ninth Circuit rejected Arpaio's conten-
tion that Turner's "reasonable relation" test replaced the Bell 
punishment test. 160 Turner addressed constitutional claims 
against cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment, raised by convicted inmates. 161 Thus, the Bell test 
is appropriate when analyzing punishment claims by pretrial 
detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment.162 
153 Demery, 378 F.3d at 1026. 
1M [d. 
iM See supra note 68. 
156 Turner, 482 U.S. 78. The mail regulation permitted correspondence between 
immediate family members incarcerated at different institutions within the jurisdic-
tion, and between inmates concerning legal matters. Correspondence between other 
inmates was only permitted if each inmate's "classification/treatment team" deemed it 
to be within the parties' best interests. [d. at 81-82. The marriage regulation required 
an inmate to obtain the superintendent's permission before being able to marry. See 
id. at 95-96. The superintendent generally granted permission only upon finding 
"compelling reasons" to do so. [d. The Supreme Court held that the mail restriction 
was constitutional, but found the marriage restriction unconstitutional. See id. at 81. 
157 See id. at 89-90. 
158 [d. at 91-92. The Court noted that restrictions on inmate correspondence fur-
thered the interests in combating communications among prison gang members. 
159 [d. at 97-98. 
160 Demery, 378 F.3d at 1028. 
161 [d. But see, Velez v. Johnson, 2005 WL 77149 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting that there 
is "little practical difference" between the standards of the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.) [d. 
162 See Hart, 2005 WL 221963 (Posner, J.) (stating "[Pretrial detainees] cannot be 
punished ... even in a nonbrutal fashion, because punishment requires a conviction.) 
[d. at *3. 
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The Ninth Circuit reasserted the standard mandated by 
Bell: The means employed in maintaining jail security cannot 
be "excessive in relation to the alternative purpose.'"aa The dis-
trict court determined that, since the web cams were placed 
nearby closed-circuit security cameras, any images they were 
monitoring were already being picked up by the security cam-
eras. l64 Thus, the webcams served no legitimate alternative 
purpose, such as improving security.16s Moreover, the web cams 
were excessive because, unlike the security camera images, the 
webcams streamed images seen by millions of viewers world-
wide.166 The lower court concluded that the webcams amounted 
to an excessive response to an "already-fulfilled security need," 
and the Ninth Circuit agreed. 167 Thus, the district court applied 
the correct legal standard. 
2. The Bell Test Applied 
The Ninth Circuit also agreed with the lower court's appli-
cation of the Bell standard to the facts of this case.l66 The court 
began its analysis by restating Bell's definition of punishment 
by government action.160 To constitute punishment, the conduct 
must result in some harm or "disability.m70 In addition, the 
purpose behind the action must be to punish.171 The harm or 
disability caused by the conduct must either significantly ex-
ceed, or be independent of, the inherent discomforts of con-
finement.172 The Ninth Circuit found that all elements of pun-
ishment were met.173 
163 Demery at 1029. 
164 Id. 
166 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
17°Id. 
171 Id; Bell 441 U.S. at 538. 
172 Demery, 378 F.3d at 1030. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 537. ("Loss of freedom of 
choice and privacy are inherent incidents of conimement in such a facility. And the fact 
that such detention interferes with the detainee's understandable desire to live as 
comfortably as possible and with as little restraint as possible during confinement does 
not convert the conditions or restrictions of detention into 'punishment.'") Id. 
173 Demery, 378 F.3d at 1030. 
20
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a. Harm 
Sheriff Arpaio's use of the web cams harmed the detainees 
by subjecting their everyday activities to world-wide scrutiny.l74 
The web cams exposed all stages of the arrest process - being 
booked, fingerprinted, as well as sitting, lying, or standing in a 
holding cell - to friends, loved ones, family, and to millions of 
strangers around the world. 175 The court stated that such expo-
sure constituted a "level of humiliation that almost anyone 
would regard as profoundly undesirable and strive to avoid. m76 
b. Purpose to Punish 
The court determined that, since the webcams were placed 
beside closed-circuit security video cameras, they provided no 
images of areas that weren't already under surveillance and 
thus served no security purpose whatsoever.177 Moreover, since 
the Sheriff's deputies were presumably already monitoring the 
security camera video, the online images provided no addi-
tional benefit.17s The court gave a brief hypothetical illustrating 
the improbable security impact: "An unruly detainee, willing to 
ignore the watchful eye of nearby prison guards, would not be 
deterred from engaging in disruptive behavior by the prospect 
of an unknown private citizen halfway around the world view-
ing his grainy image over the internet."179 
The Sheriff gave two other arguments defending the web-
cams. First, public access to the online images of detainees 
being fingerprinted and searched would deter the public from 
participating in criminal activity. ISO Second, Maricopa County 
had an interest in opening the pretrial detention centers to 
public scrutiny.ISI 
The court rejected the notion that deterrence and retribu-
tion are legitimate nonpunitive objectives. l82 Accordingly, they 
17. [d. 
175 [d. 
176 [d. at 1029-1030. 
177 [d. at 1030. 
178 [d. 
178 [d. 
180 [d. at 1031. 
181 [d. 
182 [d. 
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do not justify the adverse conditions of pretrial detention. 183 
Creating unfavorable detention conditions to further deter-
rence is impermissible because it does not comport with the 
main objectives of detaining persons before trial: to assure 
their presence at trial and maintain security and order at the 
facility. 184 
Additionally, the Court found neither of these objectives 
served by the County's interest in opening detention centers to 
the public. 185 While informing the general public about the ad-
ministration of criminal justice, assuring accountability, and 
subjecting facilities to public scrutiny are valid governmental 
interests, they do not justify the "broad public exposure" of the 
detainees' "intimate circumstances" when neither of the pur-
poses of pretrial detention are served. 186 The majority cited two 
Supreme Court cases supporting the rights of criminally ac-
cused from public exposure, Houchins u. KQED, Inc. and Wil-
son v. Layne!87 
In Houchins, a broadcasting company sought access to tour 
a county jail as part of its investigation of an inmate suicide 
that occurred there. 188 The Sheriff denied access, and the 
broadcasting company sued. The district court enjoined the 
Sheriff from denying access to the jail and the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed. 189 In reversing, the Supreme Court recognized that 
"[i]nmates in jails, prisons, or mental institutions retain certain 
fundamental rights of privacy; they are not like animals in a 
zoo to be filmed and photographed at will by the public or by 
media reporters, however "educational" the process may be for 
others. 190 This passage from Chief Justice Burger's majority 
183 [d. 
184 [d. See also Duran v. Elrod 542 F.2d 998,999 (7th Cir. 1976) ("[AJs a matter of 
due process, pre-trial detainees may suffer no more restrictions than are reasonably 
necessary to ensure their presence at trial.") 
1& [d. 
1B6 [d. at 1032. 
187 [d; Houchins, 438 U.S. 1; Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999). 
188 Houchins, 438 U.S. at 3. 
189 [d. at 7. 
190 See id. at 5 n"2. Houchins focused on the broadcasting company's First 
Amendment rights, and not the inmates' Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment rights. 
The Court held that news media have no greater First Amendment right of access to 
the county jail over and above that of other persons. [d. at 16. 
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opinion has been repeatedly cited as a basis for inmate privacy 
rights. 101 
In Wilson, deputy federal marshals and local sheriffs 
deputies invited a Washington Post reporter and photographer 
to accompany them on a "media ride-along" in the execution of 
an arrest warrant for Dominic Wilson. ,02 At 6:45 a.m., plain 
clothes officers arrived at the home of his parents, Charles and 
Geraldine Wilson, believing Dominic lived there. ,03 The officers, 
along with the reporters, entered the Wilson's home when 
Charles and Geraldine were still in bed. ,04 Dressed only in a 
pair of briefs, Charles went into the living room to confront the 
officers. 105 The officers, believing he was Dominic, wrestled 
Charles to the floor as his wife Geraldine emerged dressed only 
in her nightgown. ,06 The reporters observed and photographed 
the confrontation between Charles and the officers, but did not 
assist the officers in their execution of the warrant. '07 The pho-
tos of the incident were never published. 108 The parents sued 
the officers, contending that the officers' actions in bringing the 
media to observe and record the attempted execution of the 
arrest warrant violated their Fourth Amendment rights. 'oo The 
Supreme Court agreed, holding that the "media ride-along" into 
the home violated the Fourth Amendment.2oo 
The Fourth Amendment requires that police actions in 
executing a warrant be related to the objectives of the author-
101 See Gary H. Loeb, Protecting the Right to Informational Privacy for HIV-
Positive Prisoners, 27 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 269, 289 (1994). 
192 Wilson, 526 U.S. at 607. 
193 Id. A "ride-along" occurs when journalists or camera crews accompany law 
enforcement into the field. For a discussion of media actors' liability under the Fourth 
Amendment in ride-alongs, see Hannah Shay Chanoine, Note: Clarifying the Joint 
Action Test For Media Actors When Law Enforcement Violates the Fourth Amendment, 
104 COLUM. L. REV. 1356 (2004). 
19< Wilson, 526 U.S. 607. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. 
197Id. 
198 Id. at 608. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. at 605-606. However, the Court also concluded that, since the state of the 
law was not clearly established at the time the search in this case took place, the offi-
cers were entitled to the defense of qualified immunity. Id. The "qualified immunity" 
defense shields government agents from liability for civil damages when their conduct 
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which reason-
able person would have known. See Kwai Fun Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 
966 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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ized intrusion.201 The Supreme Court determined that the pres-
ence of the reporters, who did not engage in the execution of 
the warrant or assist the police in their task, was not related to 
the objective of the authorized intrusion, the apprehension of 
petitioners' son. 202 The officers argued that they should be able 
to exercise reasonable discretion in determining when it would 
further law enforcement missions to permit members of the 
news media to accompany officers in executing a warrant.203 In 
addition, the officers asserted numerous reasons to justify "me-
dia ride-alongs," namely that the presence of third parties 
could serve in some situations to minimize police abuses and 
protect suspects, to protect the safety of the officers, to serve 
the law enforcement purpose of publicizing the government's 
efforts to combat crime, and to facilitate accurate reporting on 
law enforcement activities.204 The Court, however, found that 
none of these reasons was sufficient to trump the Fourth 
Amendment right to residential privacy.205 
The Demery court used this Fourth Amendment case to il-
lustrate how an invasion of privacy can constitute punish-
ment.206 The majority also found Sheriff Arpaio's public educa-
tion argument in support of his webcam policy weak because 
displaying images of the detainees to millions of internet users 
all over the world was not connected to goals associated with 
educating the citizens of Maricopa County:07 
C. THE DISSENT 
Judge Carlos Bea dissented on three grounds. First, he 
found the case to be moot.208 He also rejected the contention 
201 Wilson, 526 U.S. at 604. See also Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987) (hold-
ing officer's moving of stereo equipment to view serial numbers, when officer was in 
respondent's apartment to find shooter during exigent circumstances, constituted "tak-
ing action, unrelated to the objectives of the authorized intrusion, which exposed to 
view concealed portions of the apartment or its contents," and "produce[dl a new inva-
sion of respondent's privacy unjustified by the exigent circumstance that validated the 
entry.") [d. at 325. 
202 Wilson, 526 U.S. at 604. 
2m [d. at 612. 
"" [d. at 612-613. 
"'" [d. at 612-614. 
206 Demery, 378 F.3d at 1032. 
207 [d. 
208 [d. at 1033-34 (Be a, J., dissenting). 
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that the webcasts caused a harm amounting to punishment:09 
Finally, Judge Bea found a rational relation between the web-
casts and legally permissible purposes stated by Sheriff Ar-
paio. 210 He concluded that the majority erroneously second-
guessed the judgment of the Sheriff.21l 
In rejecting the majority's conclusion that the public hu-
miliation and shame experienced by the detainees constituted 
punishment, the dissent compared the webcasts to "perp 
walks."212 Judge Bea found the detainees' shame and humilia-
tion to be attendant circumstances of the government's legiti-
mate aim of maintaining transparency in the criminal justice 
system.213 In addition, he compared the detainees' claims of 
harm to the Fourth Amendment claims raised by arrestees sub-
jected to perp-walks. 214 Citing Hudson, Judge Bea argued that 
the detainees lacked an expectation of privacy in their cells.215 
Thus, while arrestees subjected to perp-walks may have a rem-
edy under the Fourth Amendment, the detainees do not.216 
Finally, Judge Bea found that deterrence of the public was 
a legitimate government interest, and the webcasts were rea-
sonably related to that purpose.217 He argued that the major-
ity's broad reading of Bell undermined the Sheriffs ability to 
prevent crime.218 Judge Bea found no constitutional violations 
in the operation of the web cams. 219 
:IJJ9 Id. at 1038 (Bea, J., dissenting). 
210 Id. at 1040 (Bea, J., dissenting). 
211 Id. at 1035. (Bea, J., dissenting). 
212 A "perp walk" is the process in which a suspect is walked past the waiting 
cameras of reporters while in police custody. See generally Kyle J. Kaiser, Note, 
Twenty·First Century Stocks and Pillory: Perp Walks as Pretrial Punishment, 88 IOWA 
L. REV. 1205 (2003). Staged perp-walks which do not advance legitimate law enforce-
ment purposes have been termed unreasonable seizures. Thus, arrestees subjected to 
perp-walks have a remedy under the Fourth Amendment. Id. Conversely, perp-walks 
that are not staged have been held constitutional. See id. The term "perp" is an abbre-
viation of "perpetrator." Id. at 1207 n.2. 
213 Demery, 378 F.3d at 1039 (Bea, J., dissenting). 
214 Id. 
216 Id. 
216Id. 
217 Id. at 1041 (Be a, J., dissenting). 
218 Id. 
219Id. 
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III. DEMERY'S IMPACT ON PRETRIAL DETAINEES' PRIVACY 
RIGHTS UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
The Ninth Circuit focused primarily on the substantive 
Due Process protections against punishment; the Fourth 
Amendment and substantive Due Process privacy rights were 
not issues in this appeal. 220 Nevertheless, the manner in which 
the detainees were punished - live web casts of their incarcera-
tion - centers on their privacy interests. The court held that 
these privacy invasions amounted to punishment; one must 
conclude that detainees enjoy an expectation of privacy in their 
cells. It is hard to imagine how public disclosure of private af-
fairs can humiliate someone unless that person enjoys an ex-
pectation of privacy in those affairs.22 ! The decision therefore 
necessarily impacts the Fourth Amendment privacy rights of 
detainees. 
Commentators have noted that the Supreme Court has yet 
to articulate the scope of protection afforded pretrial detainees 
under the Fourth Amendment!22 As a result, it remains un-
clear as to what, if any, greater protection the Fourth Amend-
ment affords detainees as opposed to convicted inmates!23 It 
does seem clear, however, that they retain some expectation of 
privacy: The Bell Court found that pretrial detainees are pro-
tected under the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable 
strip searches, suggesting those strip searches constitute pun-
ishment!2' Logically, the main reason a strip search consti-
22<l Appellee's Answering Brief at 4 n.1, Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 
2004) (No. 03-15698) ("Appellees do not accept the decision that the Fourth Amend-
ment does not apply to the circumstances of this case, but that is not at issue in this 
appeal, which addresses a preliminary injunction grounded in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause.") available at 2003 WL 22716971. 
221 Thus, it is difficult to reconcile the Arizona district court's dismissal of privacy 
claims with its holding that the webcams constituted punishment under the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Note that Judge Bea stated in his dissent, 
"The district court properly rejected Appellees' claims of violations of privacy rights for 
the best of reasons: The Supreme Court has held that prisoners in custody do not have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells arising from the Fourth Amendment." 
Demery, 378 F.3d at 1038 n.8 (Be a J., dissenting). 
222 See Helmer, supra note 29, at 255; see generally, Irene M. Baker, Comment, 
Wilson v. Spain: Will Pretrial Detainees Escape the Constitutional "Twilight Zone"?, 75 
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 449 (2001). 
223 See Helmer, supra note 29, at 255. 
224 See MacGregor, supra note 116, at 168 (citing Helmer, supra note 29, at 255). 
See also, Bell, 441 U.S. at 560. Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist wrote, "[wle 
do not underestimate the degree to which these searches may invade the personal 
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tutes punishment is because it is a dehumanizing violation of 
privacy.225 Nevertheless, the Court has stated that any Fourth 
Amendment expectation of privacy would be of a "diminished" 
nature.226 Indeed, many Fourth Amendment rights are relin-
quished upon confinement. 227 Nonetheless, as one court noted, 
"[t]he door on prisoner's rights against unreasonable searches 
has not been slammed shut and locked.'!228 
Although pretrial detainees retain some expectation of pri-
vacy, the Fourth Amendment does not apply to a jail cell 
searched in furtherance of security or maintenance purposes.229 
When those purposes are absent, however, it seems clear that 
such a search is unreasonable and violates the Fourth Amend-
ment.230 This is because the Fourth Amendment's application is 
not limited by the borders of the inmate's cell, but depends on 
the specific interests involved. 231 
privacy of inmates. Nor do we doubt ... that on occasion a security guard may conduct 
the search in an abusive fashion. Such an abuse cannot be condoned. The searches 
must be conducted in a reasonable manner." Id. 
225 See Robin Lee Fenton, Comment, The Constitutionality of Policies Requiring 
Strip Searches of All Misdemeanants and Minor Traffic Offenders, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 
175 (1985) ("Psychological testimony has revealed that the intrusion is not limited to 
causing physical discomfort. The psychological after-effects are similar to rape; those 
who were subjected to body cavity searches hesitate to participate in normal sexual 
relations afterwards.") Id. at 187 (citing Simons, Strip Search: Women Arrested for 
Minor Traffic Violations Have Had Their Bodies Probed and Their Minds Mugged, 6 
BARRISTER 8 (1979». See also Jill Duman, Strip Search Litigation Taking Off, THE 
RECORDER, October 26, 2004 (discussing multimillion dollar settlement paid by Sacra-
mento County to persons subjected to routine visual strip searches even though ar-
rested only for routine, nonviolent offenses). 
226 Bell, 441 U.S. at 557. 
2Z1 Karoline E. Jackson, Note: The Legitimacy of Cross-Gender Searches and Sur-
veillance in Prisons: Defining an Appropriate and Uniform Review, 73 IND. L.J. 959, 
963 (1998). See generally, Substantive Rights Retained by Prisoners, 91 GEO. L.J. 887 
(2003) (noting pretrial detainees may be subject to visual body-cavity searches, have 
their mail opened by jail officials, have phone calls monitored, and have a limited pri-
vacy right in their cells.) 
228 Cohen, 796 F.3d at 23. 
229 See State v. Twyman, 2001 Del. Super. LEXIS 305 (2001) ("Reading the Hud-
son, Bell, and Block standards together, although pre-trial detainees retain some ex-
pectation of privacy, the Fourth Amendment does not apply to a search by jail officials 
of a pre-trial detainee's cell for security or maintenance purposes.") Id. at *5. 
230 See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 729 A.2d 55 (1999) (holding the Fourth Amendment 
precluded a warrantless search of an inmate's cell for the sole purpose of obtaining 
information for a superceding indictment); Cohen, 796 F.2d at 23 (holding the Fourth 
Amendment was violated when a corrections officer searched an inmate's cell at the 
behest of the prosecution to find evidence that would bolster the prosecution's case). 
231 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 768 (1966). 
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Bell, Block and Hudson commanded that inmates' Fourth 
Amendment privacy interests yield to society's interest in safe 
penal institutions!32 Demery exemplifies how inmate privacy 
interests need not yield where those security concerns are ab-
sent. Accordingly, Demery provides guidance to Ninth Circuit 
courts in construing the "diminished" privacy interest retained 
by pretrial detainees: Detainees retain an expectation of pri-
vacy in their persons and cells that must yield only to legiti-
mate governmental means of maintaining institutional secu-
rity. 
The Demery majority mentions the Fourth Amendment 
only once, discussing it in the context of Wilson's holding!33 
The court's use of Wilson, a Fourth Amendment case, to sup-
port its discussion of punishment is significant. The search in 
Wilson occurred in the home; nowhere is the protective force of 
the Fourth Amendment more powerful. 234 Yet in comparing the 
web casts' intrusiveness to Wilson's media ride-along, the 
Demery court suggests the detainees had a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in their cells warranting as much protection as 
afforded the Wilson plaintiffs. The court properly recognized 
that the psychological harm caused by a privacy invasion is not 
mitigated simply because the invasion occurs in a jail!35 
In contrast, the Supreme Court in Hudson declared in-
mates have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their cells 
under the Fourth Amendment. 236 This does not render Demery 
inconsistent with Hudson. Hudson's holding was made under 
the presumption that corrections officials conduct searches 
based on the needs of institutional security!37 Sheriff Arpaio's 
web cam policy fell entirely outside of that framework; the web-
casts were not reasonably related to any legitimate security 
232 See Bell, 441 U.S. at 560 ("Balancing the significant and legitimate security 
interests of the institution against the privacy interests of the inmates, we conclude 
that [officials may conduct body-cavity searches on less than probable cause]"); see also 
Hudson, 468 U.S. at 527. ("The recognition of privacy rights for prisoners in their 
individual cells simply cannot be reconciled with the concept of incarceration and the 
needs and objectives of penal institutions.") 
233 Demery, 378 F.3d at 1032. 
234 Los Angeles Police Protective League v. Gates, 907 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1990) 
("Nowhere is the protective force of the fourth amendment more powerful than it is 
when the sanctity of the home is involved.") [d. at 884. 
235 See Fenton, supra note 224. 
235 See Hudson, 468 U.S. 517. 
237 See, supra note 125. 
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interest. Accordingly, the jail's exploitative scrutiny consti-
tuted an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
By rejecting Sheriff Arpaio's attempts to justify intrusive 
violations of privacy, the Ninth Circuit confirmed that detain-
ees maintain tangible privacy rights. Indeed, greater recogni-
tion and protection of inmates' Fourth Amendment privacy 
rights comports with Bell's assertion that, no matter how im-
perative the needs of law enforcement officials, confined indi-
viduals "retain certain fundamental rights of privacy."238 Jail 
restrictions that infringe upon these fundamental rights, yet 
fail to serve the legitimate goal of institutional security, cannot 
stand. 
Demery is consistent with Bell, Block, and Hudson in re-
quiring that regulations be rationally related to legitimate se-
curity goals. However, Demery could be interpreted as going 
further in three respects. First, it refines the theory of Hudson: 
Inmates are not entirely without any subjective expectation of 
privacy. Second, the Ninth Circuit has added more substance to 
an inmate's subjective expectation of privacy. Our society rec-
ognizes a reasonable expectation that privacy may not be in-
vaded by restrictions unassociated with institutional security. 
Furthermore, while the fact of an arrest may be widely publi-
cized, the arrest process itself may not be.239 This case shows a 
promising trend towards the recognition of privacy rights for 
inmates. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In Demery v. Arpaio, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
recognized that pretrial detainees have an expectation of pri-
vacy in their cells. This case provides an example of how an 
unreasonable violation of that privacy can run afoul of both 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment principles. While courts 
must afford broad deference to corrections officials, this defer-
ence should not preclude close analysis of a challenged policy in 
light of institutional security. Scrutiny of detainees and their 
238 Bell, 441 U.S. at 540. 
238 Demery, 378 F.3d at 1032 n.6 (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) 
(holding disclosure of an arrest record does not violate a constitutionally protected 
right of privacy). 
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cells for purposes unrelated to institutional security is an un-
reasonable intrusion of privacy. Accordingly, courts should 
apply the Fourth Amendment to jail cells. 240 Demery appears to 
open the way for greater Fourth Amendment protection of pre-
trial detainees. 
IANWoon· 
"'" See generally, WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.9(a), at 407-08 (4th ed. 2004) ("It would be most unfortunate 
if Hudson were extended so as to deprive pretrial detainees, as yet not convicted of the 
crimes alleged, of all privacy and possessory rights in their effects. For example, if a 
pretrial detainee was subjected to a cell search not 'even colorably motivated by insti-
tutional security concerns,' then surely Hudson should not be treated as foreclosing 
challenge of that search.") (citing Cohen, 796 F.2d at 23). 
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